We investigated attitudes toward positionality among rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia, using a tailored survey experiment. On average, we found positional concerns neither in income per se nor in income from aid projects among the farmers. These results support the claim that positional concerns are positively correlated with absolute level of income of a country.
Introduction
Positional (or status) concern has been a frequently-discussed and well-documented phenomenon in developed countries (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway 1998; JohanssonStenman et al. 2002; . Thorstein Veblen (1899 Veblen ( /2005 introduced this issue as a broad phenomenon across society by writing "no class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, forgoes all customary conspicuous consumption". A result of positional concerns is that the utility derived from a good depends not only on the absolute amount of the good consumed, but also on the relative amount of the good consumed compared to the consumption of other individuals. Positional concerns have been empirically investigated using data on self-reported happiness (or "subjective wellbeing" or "life satisfaction") from surveys, as well as from tailored survey experiments.
To investigate positional concerns in the happiness framework, the average income of others (denoted as relative income in these analyses) is used as an indicator to measure positional concerns. The impact of relative income on happiness is then studied, while controlling for the subject's own absolute income. The general conclusion from this resarch shows that happiness is significantly and negatively affected by relative income (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005;  and especially .
1 Tailored survey experiments-constructed to explicitly identify the degree to which individuals care for absolute and relative income or consumption-have also shown that people do have positional concerns both for income as well as for consumption of specific goods, such as cars and holidays (see e.g., 3 Alpizar et al. 2005; Carlsson et al. 2007a; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Solnick and Hemenway 1998, 2007) .
In a recent paper, discussed the impact of relative income on happiness within and across countries. They argued that relative income concerns increase as one moves from poorer to richer countries. But still, positional concerns may also influence people in very poor countries. In the same vein, Frey and Stutzer (2002) argued that, when absolute income is above some subsistence level, other factors, such as relative income, start to influence well-being. However, most of the research on positional concerns is based on data from Western countries that are rich in absolute terms, and research on survey experiments is predominantly based on preferences stated by well-off (comparatively) university students in Western countries. Some exceptions exist, such as the study by Carlsson et al. (2007b) in Vietnam, where they found very low positional concerns among poor rural Vietnamese farmers. The objective of this paper is to test whether positional concerns matter among extremely poor people using a two-part survey experiment. Our study was conducted in 4 Northern Ethiopia, 3 which is one of the poorest regions in the world, using a similar set up to Alpizar et al. (2005) , for example. We surveyed farmers in the village of Abraha
We Atsbaha, in northern Ethiopia. The experiment focused on positional concerns in two dimensions: 1) yearly income from all sources, and 2) income from an aid package.
In the first experiment, we tested for positional concerns for overall income and, more specifically, for the claim in 
Experiment Design
The two most common ways to model relative position in a utility framework are 1) a ratio comparison utility function, ) , (
, where x is the individual's income and x is the average income in the society (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980; Persson 1995) ; or 2) an additive comparison utility function, ) , ( Akerlof 1997; Knell 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000) . In this paper, we chose to apply the following additive comparison utility function
where γ measures the marginal degree of positional concern, i.e., it measures the proportion of the total change in utility that comes from an increase in relative income after a marginal increase of own income.
In order to test the effect of positional concern in both the dimensions of income per se and income from aid package, we applied a survey experiment. We created a scenario describing the situation where individuals are about to make decision. In the experiment on income, subjects were told that they could choose between living in two villages, and that the annual income (from all sources) earned by them and other people differed in each village. The income was described as the annual income in Ethiopian birr (ETB). The respondents were asked to make six choices between paired alternatives that would prefer to have implemented. Because most of our subjects had no formal education and many were illiterate, the instructions were given verbally in the local language (Tigrinya), and the same procedure was applied for the socioeconomic questions.
6
The income across the choice sets was constructed to measure the degree of positional concern. For example, in the first choice situation, an individual's yearly income in alternative A was ETB 2,990 and the average yearly income for others in the village was ETB 3,900; while, in alternative B, the individual's yearly income was ETB 2,860
and the average yearly income in the village was also lower at ETB 2,600. (See box 1 in the appendix for the full description of the scenario read to the subjects.)
If a respondent was indifferent between living in these two villages, then we have, in the case of the additive comparison utility function, that
The marginal degree of positional concern for the first choice set can be calculated as The subjects were asked to make repeated choices between two villages to live in, which gave us information about their degree of positional concerns, at least within an upper and lower bound. The construction of our survey was such that alternative A remained the same throughout the experiments, while the levels varied for alternative B.
The levels used in the experiments, together with the implicit marginal degree of positional concern, are summarized in table 1. We determined the implicit marginal degree of positional concerns for a specific individual as follows. When an individual preferred alternative A over alternative B i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), then we knew that the marginal degree of positional concern was below the level calculated at that specific choice situation. In the survey, the respondents were asked to make choices until alternative A was chosen, meaning that each respondent was presented with a maximum of six choices for income.
The income experiment from aid project was constructed in the same way, where subjects were told that they could choose between living in two villages, where their income from implemented bee-keeping packages, as well as the other people's, would differ in each village. The income from bee keeping in a village was described as the annual income for them and the mean annual income for the others in the village. This was then followed by six paired choices to trace the marginal degree of positionality.
(The full description of scenario read to the subjects is in box 2 in the appendix.) Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of the marginal degree of positional concerns for the two survey experiments among 94 farmers. 6 The subjects were randomly selected from a total of 584 households.
Results
8 concerned with their positionality and chose alternative A in the first choice situation (60.6 and 65.7 percent for income per se and income from aid packages, respectively).
The estimated median degree of positionality was 0 for both experiments, and the mean degree of positionality was 0.158 for income per se and 0.177 for the income obtained from the aid projects. These results obtained from raw data support the hypothesis that the concern for relative position in poor societies is a very small component of individuals' total utility.
(Table 2 about here)
We also analyzed the degree of positional concerns in the two experiments using regression analyses. Table 3 
Discussions and Conclusion
This paper investigates the hypotheses concerning whether extremely poor individuals have positional concerns in the dimensions of income per se and income from an aid package. We used a survey experiment approach, in which the individuals chose between two villages to live in where they and the other people had different average incomes in each village, to calculate the marginal degree of positional concerns in a rural part of Ethiopia. We found the estimated mean degree of positional concerns to be very low in absolute terms. Our results showed much lower concern for positionality compared to similar studies conducted in developed countries. Moreover, our results are in line with the discussion in that people in poorer countries have lower positional concerns.
There are several explanations for why the low degree of positional concern occurred. Our subject pool is extremely poor and during some part of the year they need foreign aid for daily food. This supports Frey and Stutzer's (2002) argument that people are concerned with positionality above a certain threshold. Moreover, the role of kinship relations is higher in rural communities in Ethiopia, compared to urban areas in Western countries, as well as informal networks (such as a labor exchange network like Debo) and insurance mechanisms (such as rotating savings and credit associations like Iquib) exist. As a result, individuals may attach a higher value to the overall welfare of their community. Clearly, more work is necessary to understand how these factors affect attitudes towards positionality and to learn in which cases our results hold. Overall, our 11 results imply that the income of others and from aid projects only marginally affect the utility of other individuals who live in the same village or participate in the same aid projects, which is important information for development policy. Health status is obtained from a question with this range of answers: 1 = very good; 2 = good; 3 = neither good nor poor; 4 = poor; and 5 = very poor. The variable used here is a dummy: health status = 1, if subject answer is 1, 2 or 3. Per capita income is calculated by dividing the income to household size. Education is a dummy variable and it is equal to unity if the subject is educated at least one year. Land size is measures in hectares.
